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This article updates select aspects of European Union (EU) corporate and financial law,
including at the level of its Member States and of Switzerland. It also presents two deci-
sions of the European Court of Human Rights affecting the twenty-eight EU Member
States and the broader forty-seven-member Council of Europe.
I. European Union Corporate Law
A. EU CONTRACT LAW DEVELOPMENT
During 2013, debate on European contract law harmonization began to focus on con-
tracting for cloud-based services, out of concern that "[the existing regulatory environ-
ment of national contract laws might not be fit for cloud-based services."' Developments
include (i) the European Commission's establishment of a working group to "assist the
Commission in the identification of safe and fair contract terms and conditions for cloud
computing services for consumers and small firms ' 2 and (ii) European Parliament deliber-
ation to recast a 2011 Commission proposal for a European Sales Law to focus on cloud-
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1. Cloud Computing Contracts, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/cloud-comput-
ing/index en.htm (last updated July 16, 2013).
2. Commission Decision 174/04, of June 18, 2013 on Setting Up the Commission Expert Group on
Cloud Computing Contracts, art. 2, 2013 Oj. (C 174) 7.
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based contracting. 3 The still-pending 2011 proposal contemplates a European Regulation
to supplement the contract law of the various Member States with a uniform European
Sales Law that contracting parties to cross-border transactions might elect.4 The still-
pending 2011 proposal extends beyond the 2008 Rome I Regulation, affording respect to
parties' agreements on the choice of law to govern their contract;5 consumer protection
initiatives such as the Consumer Rights Directive; 6 and various discrete initiatives of har-
monization relative to contracts, e.g., the directive on combating late payments relative to
default interest rates.7 The 2013 proposed focus on cloud-based services avoids the argu-
ment that the ratification of the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods
(CISG) by the European Union Member States other than Ireland, Malta, Portugal, and
the United Kingdom s obviates much of the incentive for an optional uniform sales law, as
cross-border sales of cloud-based services do not comprise the sale of goods regulated by
the CISG. Further, the focus on cloud-based services would contemplate a mandatory,
rather than an optional framework, thus achieving, at least as to the narrow category of
contracting for cloud-based services, an aspiration of those who argue that the varying
contract law of the Member States should be replaced in its entirety by a uniform body of
European Union law.9
B. EFFICIENCY IN CROSS BORDER TRANSACTIONS
Following the European Commission's Communication Europe 2020: A Strategy for
Smart, Sustainable, and Inclusive Growth,10 the EU 2012 Action Plan on company law and
corporate governance identified three priorities: (1) enhancing transparency, (2) engaging
shareholders, and (3) supporting companies' growth.I Steps taken or to be taken include:
3. Draft Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common
European Sales Law, at 12, COM (2011) 635 (Feb. 18, 2013), availahle at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/pr/92 7/927 290/927 290en.pdf, see also Legal Affairs Committee, EURO
PEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/juri/subject-files.html?id=20121023CD
T54280 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (concerning September 2013 scheduled vote of European Parliament
Legal Affairs Committee vote on amendments to Commission 2011 proposal).
4. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: A Common European Sales Law to Facilitate Cross-Border
Transactions in the Single Market, COM (2011) 636 final (Oct. 11, 2011).
5. Commission Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), art. 3, 2008 OJ. (L 177) 10; see also PATRICK DEL
DUCA, CHOOSING THE LANGUAGE OF TRANSNATIONAL DEALS: PRACTICALITIES, POLICY, AND LAW RE
FORM 222-29 (2010).
6. Council Directive 2011/83, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on
Consumer Rights, art. 1, 2011 OJ. (L 304) 72 (Nov. 22, 2011) (EU).
7. Council Directive 2011/7, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on
Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions, art. 1, 2011 OJ. (L 48) 5 (February 23, 2011) (EU).
8. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489
U.N.T.S. 3.
9. See PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON
FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) (Christian von Bar et al. eds, 2009), availahle at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
policies/civil/docs/dcfr outline edition-en.pdf
10. See Communication from the Commission Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive
Growth, COM (2010) 2020 final (Mar. 3, 2010).
11. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Govern-
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(1) Tranfer of corporate seat. As the European Court of Justice asserted in its 2012 Vale
decision,12 beyond the contemplation of specific legislative instruments of European
Law such as Directive 2005/56/EC providing for the merger of limited liability
companies from different Member States,13 the right of freedom of establishment
contemplated by the European Treaties is directly applicable to allow a company to
move its seat from one Member State to another. As a corollary, any legal provision
by a Member State that would frustrate such right is inapplicable. The February
2012 Regner Report' 4 declared that a corporate seat transfer should not circumvent
national corporate, labor, and tax provisions,'5 and that the transfer should be tax
neutral.16 During the ensuing public consultations, stakeholders supported the pro-
posal of new legislation, a Fourteenth Company Directive. 17 Public consultation
concluded in April 2013, but the Commission did not take any actions while con-
ducting a cost-benefit analysis.'8 The summary of the consultation has not yet been
published. 19
(2) Improving the mechanism/or cross-border mergers (CBM). The Commission is analyz-
ing a study, not yet published,20 on five years of application of Directive 2005/5621
on cross-border mergers with reference to cross-border company mobility. The
issue is whether to amend Directive 2005/56 or replace it with a so-called Tenth
Company Directive.
(3) Cross Border Divisions. A company seeking to split itself into parts to be headquar-
tered in separate Member States would typically undertake steps including creation
ance A Model Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies, COM (2012) 740
final (Dec. 12, 2012).
12. See Case C-378/10, Vale Epitesi kft, 2012 E.C.R. 00000 (july 20, 2012), available at http://curia.europa.
eu/juris/liste.jsflanguage=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-378/10&td=ALL#.
13. Council Directive 2005/56, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on
Cross-Border Mergers of Limited Liability Companies, art. 1, 2005 O.J. (L 310) 3 (Nov. 25, 2005) (EC)
[hereinafter Council Directive 2005/56].
14. Report W,ith Recommendations to the Commission on the 14th Company Law Directive on the Cross-Border
Transfer of Company Seats (2011/2046 (INI)), at 7 (Jan. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Cross-Border Report], available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2012-0008+0+
DOC+PDF+VO//EN; see also Report 9]anuary 20124ith Recommendations to the Commission on the 14th Com-
pany Law Directive on the Cross-Border Transfer of Company Seats (2011/2046 (INI)), EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=A7-2012-8&lan-
guage=EN] [hereinafter Cross-Border Report] (last updated Jan. 19, 2012).
15. Cross-Border Report, supra note 14.
16. Id.
17. See Feedback Statement: Summary of Responses to the Public Consultation of the Future of European Company
Law, (july 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/consultations/docs/2012/companylaw/
feedback statementen.pdf.
18. Consultation on the Cross-Border Transfers of Registered Offices of Companies: Consultation by DG Markt,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/consultations/2013/seat-transfer/docs/consultation-docu-
menten.pdf.
19. See Consultation on the Cross-Border Transfers of Registered Offices of Companies, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/consultati6ons/2013/seat-transfer/index-en.htm (last visited Jan. 28,
2014).
20. Publication will be available on the European Commission website. See DG Internal Market and Ser-
vices, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal-market/studies/index en.htm (last updated
Dec. 31, 2013).
21. Council Directive 2005/56, supra note 13.
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of a new company, transfer of assets, transfer of seat, and a public consultation. The
Commission may choose to propose a framework for such division as part of reform
of the cross-border merger Directive.
(4) Enhancement of European Company (SE) and European Cooperative (SCE) Charters.
The number of new European businesses under SE (Regulation 2157/2001)22 and
SCE (Regulation 1435/2003)23 charters is encouraging. On July 1, 2013, there were
1865 SEs and approximately twenty-five SCEs.2 4 The Commission has no current
plans to amend these Regulations but rather seeks to educate entrepreneurs about
their advantages. 25
(5) Management of Group of Companies. During public consultation, stakeholders fa-
vored the introduction of a legislative framework aimed at improving group man-
agement in cross-border operations. 26 An EU proposal is anticipated to recognize
an "Interest of the Group," intended as the possibility for a holding company to
manage, supervise, and coordinate in the best interest of all the component parts of
the group. 27 A second line of action advocated is European legislation to promote
simplified communication to investors,28 although the Commission has yet to take
any action.
C. SECURITIES FRAUD AND WHISTLEBLOWERS
The European Union has continued its progress on: (1) unifying its securities regula-
tory framework and (2) protecting whistleblowers. A key foundation for the most recent
progress in the securities area with respect to protection of whistleblowers is a 2011 ruling
of the European Court for Human Rights in Heinisch v. Germany.29
On September 10, 2013, the European Parliament and the Council of the European
Union came to a provisional agreement on Proposal for Regulation 2011/0295, which
would replace Directive 2003/6/EC.30 The Regulation seeks to give regulators sufficient
information to deter and punish market abuse, manipulation, and insider dealing,31 and
22. Council Regulation 2157/2001, of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE), 2001
O.J. (L 294) (Nov. 10, 2001) (EC).
23. Council Regulation 1435/2003, of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society
(SCE), 2003 O.J. (L 207) (Aug. 18, 2003) (EC).
24. See Europages European business directory, EUBUSINESS (Apr. 29, 2013) http://www.eubusiness.com/
europages.
25. See The European Company Your business opportunity?, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/inter-
nal-market/company/se/indexen.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
26. See Modermsation of Company Law and Enhancement of Corporate Governance, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http:/
/ec.europa.eu/internal-market/company/modern/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. Heinisch v. Germany, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. T 45, 93-95 (holding that freedom of expression under the
European Convention on Human Rights protects whistleblowing).
30. Texts Adopted at the Sitting of Tuesday 10 September 2013, at 416, COM (2013), (Sept. 10, 2013).
31. Id. at 419.
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would protect whistleblowers revealing securities fraud. 32 Because the European Parlia-
ment has approved the Regulation, the European Council is likely to make it law.33
The proposed Regulation would (1) protect whistleblowers from retaliation, (2) intro-
duce an incentive system, and (3) strengthen the confidentiality of the reporting system. 34
Its Article 29, § 1 mandates Member States to institute "effective mechanisms," including
processes that acknowledge complaints and provide follow-up, "appropriate" legal protec-
tions of whistleblowers, protection of personal data, and a right to due process. 35
(1) Retaliation: The specifics of the protections against retaliation remain undrafted in
2013.36
(2) Incentive System: Article 29, § 2 proposes a financial incentive program that recom-
mends, but does not require, Member States to provide financial incentives for eli-
gible whistleblowers who offer new and "salient" information about "potential
breaches," if the information leads to an imposition of administrative or criminal
sanctions. 37 Unlike similar provisions in the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act, 38 there is no
requirement of a minimum amount of legal or administrative sanctions,3 9 "indepen-
dent knowledge," or the element of good will.40 In its October 2012 Committee
Report, the Rapporteur of the Committee on Legal Affairs welcomed this optional
provision and emphasized that the Regulation should balance encouraging and pro-
tecting whistleblowers with consideration for legal traditions in Europe. 4 1
Confidentiality: The Regulation also would protect the secrecy of "any confidential in-
formation received, exchanged, or transmitted pursuant to this Regulation."42 Authorities
must comply with the framework of the Data Privacy Regulation, which further protects
the personal information of the communicant. 43 The information shall, at most, be de-
leted after five years. 44
32. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing and market manipu-
lation (market abuse), COM (2011) 651 final (Oct. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Proposal].
33. See Legislative Powers, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/
0081f4b3c7/Law-making-procedures-in-detail.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
34. Proposal, supra note 32, at § 3.4.5.2.
35. Id. art. 29.
36. On October 22, 2012, the European Parliament amended the proposal to contemplate a
whistleblower's anonymity. Proposal, supra note 32, art. 29. The Parliament also applied these rights against
private employers. Id. art. 29(1)(d). Previously, the Regulation had required only "adequate measures." Id.
art. 36. It also required "appropriate protections" to protect whistleblowers from retaliation. Id. art. 29(1)(b).
37. Proposal, supra note 32, art. 29(1)(2).
38. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
39. Id. § 2 LF(a)(1); see also Thomas C.R. Reynolds, Securing Protectionsfor Whistleblowers of Securities Fraud
in the United States and the European Union, 13 Chi.-Kent J. Int'l & Comp. L. 201, 210 (2013).
40. Contra 17 C.F.R. § 240.2 LF(a)(3) (2013).
41. Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing and
market manipulation (market abuse), A7-0347/2012 (Oct. 22, 2012).
42. Proposal, supra note 32, art. 21.
43. Id. art. 22.
44. Id.; see also Thomas C.R. Reynolds, supra note 39.
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D. MARKET ABUSE
The first Market Abuse Directive (MAD)41 established a general framework that Mem-
ber States were to transpose into national law to help strengthen investor confidence in
EU financial markets by providing sanctions against market abuse (i.e., insider trading and
market manipulation). Under the MAD, Member States were to maintain an effective
administrative oversight of financial markets capable of identifying authors of operations
affecting the integrity of the market and of imposing sanctions. 46
An assessment carried out by the European Commission stressed discrepancies in the
implementation of the MAD by Member States including in the definitions of offenses
and sanctions, and in difficulties encountered by enforcement authorities. 47 This assess-
ment, together with the subprime and subsequent sovereign debt and liquidity crises, has
led to proposals for a new MAD and a Regulation on market abuse.
To provide a brief background, in October 2011, the European Commission proposed a
Directive and a Regulation on market abuse to harmonize and update the rules in force in
Member States.48 In July 2012, following the revelations concerning LIBOR manipula-
tions, the European Commission amended the proposals to extend market abuse to the
manipulation or attempted manipulation of benchmarks. 49 In December 2012, the Euro-
pean Union Ministers of Justice approved the Commission's proposal to provide sanctions
of benchmark manipulations. 0
In September 2013, the European Parliament ratified the agreement concerning the
Regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation. The proposal for a Directive to
deal with criminal sanctions has been agreed in principle by the Council, and discussions
between the Parliament and the Member States on the issue should commence in October
2013.1 Adoption of the regulation will occur when a political agreement is reached on
the Markets in Financial Instrument Directive 11,12 which presents a series of measures to
45. Council Directive 2003/6/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of January 28, 2003 on
insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), art. 12, 2003 Oj. (L 96/16) (EC).
46. Id. arts. 38-39.
47. See Commission Staff Working Paper Executive Summary of Impact Assessment, SEC (2011) 1227
final (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/securities/docs/isd/mifid/SEC 2011
1227_en.pdf
48. Proposal, supra note 32.
49. Press Release, European Commission, Libor Scandal: Commission proposes EU-wide action to fight
rate-fixing (july 25, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/securities/docs/abuse/
SEC 2011 1218_en.pdf
50. Memorandum from the European Commission, Libor Scandal: Commission proposes EU-wide action
to fight rate-fixing (july 25, 2012), availahie at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-12-
963_en.htm?locale=en.
51. Press Release, European Parliament, Tougher sanctions for financial markets manipulation (Oct. 9,
2013), availahie at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/201309061PR18863/html/
Tougher -sanctions- for- financial-markets- manipulation.
52. Memorandum from the European Commission, Statement by Commissioner Michel Barnier on the
endorsement by European Parliament of the political agreement on new European rules for market abuse
(Sep. 10, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO- 13-773 en.hm?locale=en.
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address the issues highlighted by the financial crisis, including improving investor protec-
tion and G20 commitments.5
3
On October 10, 2013, the Commission turned to the European Securities and Market
Authority (ESMA) for "advice on possible delegated acts concerning the regulation on
insider dealing and market manipulation." 4
II. European Union Financial Law
A. Swiss PUBLIC COMPANY TRANsPARENCY
During 2013, milestones in Swiss corporate governance reform towards transparency
included:
(1) the Swiss Business Federation's publication of its Swiss Code of Best Practice for
Corporate Governance for public and private companies; 5
(2) the 2008 adoption by the SIX Swiss Exchange of its Directive Corporate Govern-
ance requiring public company disclosure concerning the board of directors and
senior management; 6 and
(3) the political debates on amending the Swiss Code of Obligations to increase trans-
parency in accounting and compensation. s7
The March 3, 2013 amendment, pursuant to the 68 percent referendum vote on the so-
called Fat Cat Initiative,5" adds Article 95(3)59 to Switzerland's federal constitution and
represents a new high watermark with respect to transparency. Article 95(3) seeks to limit
excessive executive salaries by subjecting executive compensation to shareholder approval.
The amendment applies solely to Swiss public companies; companies incorporated in
Switzerland and listed either on the Swiss or a foreign stock exchange. 60 The Federal
Office of Justice accordingly prepared a preliminary draft of the Interim Ordinance
53. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial instruments
repealing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Cou1cil, COM (2011) 656 final (Oct. 20,
2011).
54. ESMA, Request to ESMA for technical advice on possible delegated acts concerning the regulation on insider
dealing and market manipulation, Oct. 10, 2013, available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/
esma ssr review mandate_20121012.pdf
55. See KARL HOFSTETTER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SWITZERLAND (2002), availahle at
www.economiesuisse.ch/de/PDF o2ODownload /%2OFiles/Studie-CorpLaw_20020701_e.pdf
56. Corporate Governance, SIX EXCHANGE RFULATION, http://www.six-exchange-regulation.com/obliga-
tions/governance-en.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2014).
57. See OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR] [CODE OF OBLIGATIONS] March 30, 1911, art. 663bbis (art. 663b),
art. 961(a) (Switz.).
58. Sometimes referred to as the "Minder Initiative." Sonia Fenazzi, Voters Solicited Over Executive Pay,
SWISSrNFO.CH (Jan. 8, 2013, 11:00), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss news/Voters solicited over execu-
tive-pay.html?cid=34665044; Chantal Britt, Minder Vote Sends Clear Signal to Executives, SWISSINFO.CH
(March 4, 2013, 11:23), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/Minder vote sends-clear signal-to execu-
tives.html?cid=35132460; Medienmritteilungen, Der Bundesrat, Abzocker Initiative wird rasch umgesetzt
(March 26, 2013) [Press Release, Rip-Off Initiative to Be Implemented Rapidly], available at
www.ejpd.adin.ch/ejpd/de/home/dokumentation/mi/2013/2013 -03 -261 .html.
59. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 95 (Switz.).
60. Id. art. 95(3).
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against Excessive Remuneration (VgdA).61 The VgdA closely tracks the Fat Cat Initiative,
but also takes into account existing corporate law. On November 20, 2013, the Federal
Office of Justice adopted the final version of VgdA, now called VegiV.62 Effective Janu-
ary 1, 2014, it will mandate Swiss public companies to comply as follows:
(1) Such companies must conform their executive compensation agreements within one
year, and revise their charter documents within two years. Shareholder general
meetings for business year 2014 must implement the executive compensation
measures.
63
(2) The shareholder general meeting must annually and individually elect the members
of the board of directors, including the chair, and of the compensation committee.
Terms of office are accordingly limited to rnm until the next shareholder general
meeting, although re-election is allowed. Pension find representatives must vote in
the interest of their beneficiaries. Abstention is admissible, if it is in the interest of
beneficiaries. Proxy voting for deposited shares and voting rights for organizations
are eliminated.64
(3) Aggregate executive board, advisory board, and management compensation must be
approved annually by the shareholder general meeting. Specifically, the meeting
must approve a remuneration report provided by the board of directors specifying
compensation to the board of directors, advisory board, and management, as well as
loans or credit lines extended to them or closely-related parties. 6
(4) Severance payments, pre-payments, and commissions for takeover or divestiture of
companies are prohibited, as is performance -related compensation not contem-
plated by the corporate charter. Corporate charter contemplation of compensation
to executive board members and third parties as well as of incentive and pension
arrangements for board directors and executives is a prerequisite to their validity.
But the absolute amounts of board or executive pay remain unregulated.66 Pre-
mium payments for commencement of work remain permissible. In contrast to
pre-payments, it constitutes compensation to executive board members for the loss
of claims towards their former employer. 6r
The VegiiV contemplates penalties of up to three years of imprisonment and fines of six
years of annual compensation for board of directors, executive board, and advisory board
members who infringe its provisions, notably by intentional receipt or payment of com-
pensation unpermitted or without shareholder general meeting approval.68
61. VERORDNUNG GEGEN DIE ABZOCKEREI [VGDA], [REGULATION AGAINST THE RIP-OFF] Nov. 22,
2013 (Switz.).
62. Medienmitteilungen, Der Bundesrat, Umsetzung der Abzocker- nitiative: Verordnung tritt am 1.Janu-
ary 2014 in Kraft (Nov. 20, 2013) [Press Release, Implementation of the Rip-Off Initiative: Regulation Enters
into Force on January 1, 2013], availahie at www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/ejpd/de/home/dokumentation/mi/
2013/2013-11-20.html.
63. VGDA, supra note 61, art. 27.
64. Id. arts. 3, 7, 11, 18, 22, 27.
65. Id. art. 13.
66. Id. art. 12(2), 20, 21.
67. ENTWURF ZUR VERORDNUNG GEGEN UBERMASSIGE VERGU [VEGuV] [REGULATION AGAINST Ex
CESSIVE COMPENSATION] Oct. 8, 2013 (Switz.), avaiahie at http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/
wirtschaft/gesetzgebung/akenrechtsrevision/voabzockerei/erl vo-d.pdf.
68. Id. art. 24f.
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Subsequently, on November 23 and 24, 2013, a referendum to limit the highest salary
in any enterprise to an amount equaling twelve times the lowest salary (the 1:12 referen-
dum) was rejected by approximately a two-thirds majority of the voters.69
B. DANISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In May 2013, Denmark's Committee on Corporate Governance published its revised
recommendations on corporate governance.7o The recommendations are "simplified
without relaxing corporate governance requirements," reduced from seventy-nine to
forty-seven, "and are divided into five categories."1 The categories on compensation and
financial reporting were left unchanged. The following categories are significantly
revised:
(1) The company's communication and interaction with its investors and other stakeholders:
Under the new recommendations, the company is to encourage shareholder exer-
cise of ownership and shareholder confidence through transparency and openness.r2
The company is to "ensure an ongoing dialogue between the company and its
shareholders," specifically with respect to shareholder familiarity concerning the
company's prospects and policies and board awareness of shareholder views. r 3 The
dialogue "may be summarized in an investor relations strategy," identifying the type
of information to be communicated between the company and its shareholders and
when, how, and to whom it is to be communicated.4 The company should identify
the types of investors it seeks to attract in its investor relations strategy.
(2) Tasks and responsibilities of the board of directors: The Committee's recommendations
focus the board's role on value creation and strategy.r5 The board of directors
should allot time "to discuss the company's overall strategic goals and value crea-
tion." The strategy discussions should result in a value creation plan to prompt a
discussion about the response of the company's strategy to its short- and long-term
opportunities and challenges.
(3) Composition and organization of the board of directors: The board of directors is tasked
with the responsibility of ensuring value creation in the company through its man-
agement. The Committee recommends that the board of directors be assembled
"so as to ensure effective performance of its tasks in a constructive and qualified
dialogue with the executive board."' 76 The board nomination process should be
"thoroughly transparent," while still taking into account the need for incorporating
new talent and diverse backgrounds in the board's composition. The Committee
69. See VORLAGE NR. 575 [BILL No. 575], VOLKSNITIATIVE 1:12 [INITIATIVE 1:12] Nov. 24, 2013
(Switz.), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20131124/det575.html.
70. COMM. ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, RECOMMENDATIONS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (May
2013), availahie at http://corporategovernance.dk/file/371640/commitee-on corporategovernnce-recom-
mendations-oncorporate-governance.pdf.
71. Recommendations on Corporate Governance, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, http://corporategovernance.dk/
english (last visited Jan. 11, 2014).
72. COMM. ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, slipra note 70, at 9.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 11.
76. Id. at 15.
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newly recommends that the board of directors establish an appropriate procedure
for its own members' annual evaluations.77 Previously, the board's chair was to have
presided the evaluation.78 The evaluation should include an assessment of the
board's "composition, work and results"; need for and benefits of a committee
structure; organization of the board's work; and the quality of the material em-
ployed by the board.79 Material changes deriving from an evaluation should appear
in the annual report's management commentary, referenced on the company's web-
site.80 The Committee recommends the appointment of audit, nomination, and
remuneration committees, as well as temporary ad hoc committees as neededsI
Listed companies will need to report implementation of the new recommendation with
the 2013 annual report, as part of the management commentary linked to their website. 82
Listed companies must "comply-or- explain. 83
For non-listed companies, the recommendations provide guidelines that are designed to
contribute to a company's long-term success through value creation and accountable man-
agement. 84 These non-listed companies are not, however, bound by the recommenda-
tions, and no explanation is required should they choose not to comply. 85
C. FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS TAx
The Financial Transactions Tax (FTF) would be levied on all transactions on financial
instruments between financial institutions when at least one party to the transaction is
located in the EU.86 The FTT originates from a European Commission proposal to in-
troduce such a tax "to "mak[e] the financial sector pay its fair share." 87 As several Member
States already impose a form of such a tax, the proposal would in effect introduce new
minimum tax rates and harmonize different existing taxes on financial transactions in the
EU.88 The European Commission welcomed the European Parliament's vote in favor of
77. Id. at 21.
78. Comm. ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, RECOMMENDATIONS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 15
(Aug. 2011), available at http://corporategovernance.dk/file/291825/committee-recommendations-august_
2011.pdf.
79. COMM. ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 70, at 21.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 19-21.
82. See NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S, Rules for Issuers of Shares (Jan. 6, 2013), http://www.nasdaqonx.
com/digitalAssets/85/85436_rulesforissuersofshares-fina106052013 clean.pdf.
83. COMM. ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 70, at 6.
84. Id. at 3.
85. Id. at 5.
86. European Union finacial transaction ax,WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EuropeanUnion fi-
nancial transaction-tax (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
87. Press Release, European Comm'n, Financial Transaction Tax: Making the Financial Sector Pay Its Fair
Share (Sept. 28, 2011), availahle at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-IP-11-1085 en.htm?locale=en.
88. European Union finzancial transaction tax, WIKIPEDiA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro-
peanUnion financial transaction tax (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
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the FIT proposal.8 9 But the European Commission has postponed the target FIT intro-
duction date from January 2014 to mid-2014.90
The European Central Bank (ECB) has entered the debate on the proposed FIT.91
The ECB's stated concern is that the cost of the FIT on iterative short-term repurchase
agreements might deprive central banks of a useful policy instrument and increase the cost
of sovereign borrowing. In April 2013 the European Commission asserted the concern to
be unfounded, however.92 Benoit Coeure, an ECB executive board member, has said that
the bank is willing to "engage constructively with governments and the European Com-
mission to ensure that the tax has no negative impact on financial stability. ' 93
D. EU BUDGETARY REGULATION UPDATE
The current Regulation on the EU budgetary process, effective January 1, 2013,94 ap-
pears to meet stakeholder needs. The 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework
(MFF),9 5 laying out EU expenditure programs, is grounded on the budgetary
Regulation.96
In its efforts to modernize financial procedures, the EU's current Regulation prioritizes:
simplification: cutting red tape, expediting procedures, and shifting the focus from
paperwork to performance;
accountability: ensuring enhanced financial management and protection of the EU's fi-
nancial interests; and
innovation: introducing financial mechanisms to enable mobilization of third-party
fumds as leverage for EU ftmds.
Implementing devices include: shorter payment deadlines, lighter administrative re-
quirements for a larger group of low-value grants, simplification and flexibility in grant
rules, greater Member State responsibility for management of EU ftmds, adjusted provi-
89. Press Release, European Comm'n, Commissioner Semeta Welcomes European Parliament's Strong
Support for the Financial Transactions Tax (May 23, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease MEMO- 12-3 75en.htm?locale=en.
90. Taxation and Customs Union, Taxation of the Financial Sector, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/
taxanon customs/taxation/other taxes/financial-sector/index-en.htm (last updated Jan. 3, 2014).
91. Ralph Atkins, ECB Offers to Help Rethink EUPlans on 'Robin Hood Tax,' THE FIN. TIMES, May 26, 2013,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/c3121802-c480-1 le2-9ac0-00144feab7de.html#axzz2qDyNlbOh.
92. EUROPEAN COMM'N, FTT- NON-TECHNICAL ANSWERS TO SOME QUESTIONS ON CORE FEATURES
AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS, availahle at http://ecteuropa.eu/taxation-customs/resources/documents/taxation/
other taxes/financial-sector/faq en.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); EUROPEAN COMM'N, How THE FTT
WORKS IN SPECIFIC CASES AND OTHER QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 36, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
taxation-customs/resources/documents/taxation/other-taxes/financial-sector/ftt-examples.pdf (last visited
Jan. 12, 2014).
93. Atkins, supra note 91.
94. 2012 O.J. (L 298) 1, 16.
95. Proposal for the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework, COM (2011), available at http://
ec.eropa.eu/budget/library/biblio/plblications/2011/mff2Oll/KV3112884ENN-web.pdf (last visited Jan.
12, 2014).
96. Id. at 3 ("The ([MFF], formerly 'financial perspectives') is not the budget of the EU for seven years. It is
a mechanism for ensuring that EU spending is predictable and at the same time subject to strict budgetary
discipline. It defines the maximum amounts ('ceilings') available for each major spending area ('heading') of
the Union's budget. Within that framework, the European Parliament and the Council, which are the 'budg-
etary authority' of the Union, have to agree each year on the budget for the subsequent year."). Id.
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sions on conflict of interests and whistle -blowing, parity for EU and Member State claims
in bankruptcy proceedings, public-private partnership enhancements, and new tools for
EU trust funds. 97
Pursuant to Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU),9 8 the MFF sets out, in relation to each major area of EU spending, the appropri-
ations ceiling for the 2014-2020 period.
The EU's "own resources" are collected by or through Member States.9 9 Pursuant to
Article 311 of the TFEU, unanimous Council decision, following consultation of the Eu-
ropean Parliament, establishes the nature of, and cap on, the EU's "own resources" for the
same time period covered by the MFF.'0 0
In July 2012, the European Commission proposed for the 2014-2020 period a maxi-
mum budget of 1033 million in commitment appropriations and of 987 million in pay-
ment appropriations. 10 1 In February 2013, a European Council agreement contemplated
a lesser maximum budget for the period of 959.988 million in commitment appropria-
tions and 908.4 billion in payment appropriations. 10 2 The budget for the 2007-2013
period was 975.8 billion in commitment appropriations, and 925.6 billion in payment
appropriations, corresponding to 1.06 percent of the EU GNI. 0 3 Relative to the Com-
mission's proposal, the Council's cuts concentrated on agricultural and cohesion policies.
The amounts proposed for the "Connecting Europe" initiative to finance energy infra-
structure, digital networks, and transport, fell from the 50 million proposed by the Euro-
pean Commission to 29.3 million.104 On November 19, 2013, the European Parliament
voted in favor of the MFF for 2014 to 2020.105
III. European Court of Human Rights
A. PRESIDENTIAL DIGNITY AND FREE SPEECH
On March 14, 2013, in Eon v. France,'0 6 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
held that France had violated Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights1 7
97. Id.
98. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Flunctioning of the European Union art. 312, March 30,
2010, 2010 OJ. (C 83) 47, 182 [hereinafter TFEU].
99. EUROPEAN COMM'N, PUBLIC FINANCE 305 (4th ed. 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/budgetl
library/biblio/publications/public fin/EU-pub-fin-en.pdf#page= 233.
100. See TFEU, supra note 98, art. 311.
101. Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation Laying Down the Multiannual Financial Framework for the Years
2014-2020, at 16, COM (2012) 388 final (July 6, 2012).
102. Council Conclusions 37/13, Multiannual Financial Framework, art. 6 (Feb. 8, 2013), available at http://
register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l =EN&t=PDF&gc= true &sc=false&f=ST% 2037 % 202013 % 201NIT&r=
Http% 3A% 2 F% 2 Fregister.consilium.europa.eu% 2 Fpd% 2 Fen% 2 F 13 % 2 Fst 00 % 2 FstOO03 7.en 13.pdf
103. European Comm'n, Financial Framework 2007-2013 (Mar. 19, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/budged/
figures/fin-fwk0713/fwkO713_en.cfm#cfO 13
104. Council Conclusions 37/13, supra note 102, art 17.
105. Press Release, European Comm'n, One Trillion Euro to Invest in Europe's Future-the EU's Budget
Framework 2014-2020 (Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP- 13 -1096-en.htm.
106. Eon v. France, App. No. 26118/10 T 13 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 14, 2013), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001- 117742#{"itemid":["001- 117742"]}.
107. European Court of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10 (Nov. 4, 1950), http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ConventionENG.pdf
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protecting the right to freedom of expression. Herve Eon had been arrested as he was
holding a placard which read "casse toi pov' con" ("Get lost, you sad prick," as translated by
the Court), alluding to an insult uttered by Nicolas Sarkozy, then the President of France,
at a man who had refused to shake hands with him. Mr. Eon was found guilty of having
offended the President of the Republic, a criminal offense under the July 29, 1881, French
Press lawlOs and sentenced to a 30 fine. The Court of Appeals confirmed the judgment.
The French Civil Supreme Court, the Cour de cassation, declined to review the case. 10 9
Mr. Eon then filed a complaint with the ECHR, arguing a violation of his right to
freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights." 0 Article 10 allows a public authority to interfere with freedom of expression, but
only if such interference is prescribed by law, is necessary in a democratic society, and
pursues one of the legitimate goals enumerated by Article 10(2), among them the protec-
tion of the reputation of others."'
The European Court of Human Rights found that fining Mr. Eon was an intrusion on
his freedom of speech.11 2 The intrusion on freedom of speech was established by statute,
Article 26 of the French Press Law that incriminates insulting the head of State, ofiense au
chef de l'Etat. The ECHR found that the legitimate interest protected was the reputation
of the President, not public order.11 3
Under the ECHR's case law, the intrusion must be "relevant and sufficient" and the
issue must be "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."114 The ECHR noted that
Mr. Eon's actions did not target the President's "private life or honour."115 Instead, the
plaintiff had the intent "to level public criticism of a political nature at the head of
State."116
Therefore, sentencing Mr. Eon constituted a restriction to freedom of speech in the
field of political debate, "where freedom of expression is of the utmost importance."' 1 7
The ECHR did not go as far as to state that Article 26 is contrary to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, which would have obliged France to abrogate it. Nevertheless
it was abrogated on August 5, 2013.118
108. Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberte de la presse [Law of July 29, 1881 on Freedom of the Press],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RSPUBLIQUE FRAN(AiSE [.O.] [OFFIciAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 30, 1881,
p. 4201.
109. Eon v. France, No. 26118/10 T 13.
110. Id. T 1.
111. Id. T 47 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority .... 2.
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society ... or the protection of the reputation or rights of others .....
112. Id. T 47.
113. Id. T 49.
114. See, e.g., Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens, and July v. France, App. Nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2007), avaiahie at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
82846#{"itemid": ["001 -82846"]}.
115. Eon v. France, No. 26118/10 T 57.
116. Id. T 58.
117. Id. T 59.
118. Loi 2013-711 du 5 aofit 2013 portant diverses dispositions d'adaptation dans le domaine de la justice en
application du droit de l'Union europeenne et des engagements internationaux de la France [Law 2013-71 lof
August 5, 2013 adapting various provisions in the field of justice under the law of the European Union and
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B. CHRISTIANITY, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AND WEARING RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS
The ECHR recently decided Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom," 9 upholding
anti- discrimination rules in the workplace in a case involving four applicants.
The first applicant, Ms. Eweida, a British Airways employee, desired to wear her cross
in a visible way rather than under her uniform. The Court was clear that Ms. Eweida's
manifestation of her religious belief is a ftindamental right 20 and that there was no real
encroachment on the interests of others.
In the next case, Ms. Chaplin, a nurse, had been advised by her employer her that
protection of health and safety in a ward was incompatible with allowing her to wear her
chain and cross, in case a patient seized it or it fell into a wound. The Court decided
"interference with [Ms. Chaplin's] freedom to manifest her religion was necessary in a
democratic society."'121
Another applicant, Ms. Ladele, was a registrar who believed same-sex unions were con-
trary to God's will and that it would be wrong for her to participate in them. The Court
had some sympathy for Ms. Ladele in that when she first became a registrar, civil partner-
ships did not exist. It was evident though that her employer, the London Borough of
Islington, was committed to promoting an equal opportnmities policy that protected all
employees and the public who used its services, including those who wanted civil partner-
ships. The Court acknowledged that the consequence for Ms. Ladele of losing her job
was serious, but the Borough's aim was to secure the rights of others who were also pro-
tected under the Convention. 122 The Court referred to existing case law123 that held that
"differences in treatment based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons
by way of justification" Using wording that makes it clear that a different outcome to Ms.
Ladele's complaints against her employer and the British Courts may have been accept-
able to the Court as well, the Court emphasized that it generally allows a wide margin of
appreciation when it comes to striking a balance between competing Convention rights.
The Court concluded that Islington Council and the various British courts that rejected
her discrimination claims did not exceed the wide "margin of appreciation available to
them."124
France's international commitments] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 6, 2013, p. 13338.
119. See Case of Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, and
36516/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 15, 2013), availahle at http://hudoc.echr.coe.ind/sites/fra/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-115881#{"itemid":["001-115881"]}.
120. Id. T 94.
121. Id. T 100.
122. European Court of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, art. 34 (Nov. 4, 1950), http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ConventionENG.pdf.
123. Case of Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, and 36516/10 T
105 (citing Karner v. Austria, App. No. 40016/98 T 37 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 24, 2003), availahle at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61263#{itemnid:[001-61263']}; Smith and Grady v.
the United Kingdom, App. Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96 T 90 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 27, 1999), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58408#{ itemid":[001-58408"]}; Schalk and
Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04 T 97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-99605#{"itemid": ["001-99605"]}).
124. Id. T 106.
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Finally, Mr. McFarlane was a counselor who had been reluctant to offer psychosexual
counseling to same-sex couples as such relationships were contrary to his Christian beliefs.
His employer, Relate, did not want him to be able to cherry pick the couples he saw as a
means of avoiding counseling same-sex couples, and he was dismissed. Unlike the Ladele
case, there was less sympathy to his plight given that his job had not changed. Mr. McFar-
lane had enrolled on the Relate psychosexual counseling course knowing that Relate had
an equal opportnities policy that would not allow filtering of clients on the grounds of
sexual orientation. Again, the Court had to consider a fair balance between competing
interests and acknowledged that losing employment was a high price to pay. Neverthe-
less, for the Court, the most important factor was that the employer's action was intended
to secure the implementation of its policy to provide counseling to everyone without
discrimination.
In all four cases, the Court avoided making definitive rules, instead showing respect for
the competing claims and thereby avoided creating an undue sense of "victory" or "tri-
umphing" of one right over another. Further application to appeal was refused.
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